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GENDER-BASED PERSECUTION: A CHALLENGE TO 
THE CANADIAN REFUGEE DETERMINATION SYSTEM 
HEATHER POTTERt 
The definition of a refugee contained in the Canadian Immigration Act 
requires that refugee claimants establish a well-founded fear of persecution 
based on one of the enumerated grounds, namely race, religion, nationality, 
membership in a particular social group or political opinion. As "sex" is not 
enumerated, many women must establish their claim on the basis of 
"membership in a particular social group. " The standard of internal cohesion 
that the courts employed in defining a "particular social group" severely 
restricted the grounds available to women claiming refugee status. New 
guidelines, encourage the acceptance of claims of gender-based persecution 
under the enumerated categories. Recent cases indicate a willingness to view 
claimants of gender-based discrimination as members of a "particular social 
group, " but these claims must still satisfj a stringent test to establish 
"persecution" and "state complicity. " The guidelines, while a positive 
development, remain an inadequate substitute for the inclusion of sex as an 
enumerated ground. 
La definition de rtfjugie de la Loi sur l'Immigration du Canada requiere 
qu 'un requerant etablft u.ne crainte de persecution bien fondee basee sur un 
des criteres enumeres, a savoir, la race, la religion, la nationalite, le fait d'etre 
membre d'un groupe social particulier, et !es opinions politiques. Puisque le 
"sexe" n'est pas un fondement enumere, plusieurs femmes doivent etablir leur 
demande sur la base de "membre d'un groupe social particulier. " La norme 
de coherence interne que !es courts indique que la definition de "groupe social 
particulier" restreint severement !es fondements disponibles pour !es femmes 
demandant le statut de refugie. Des nouvelles directives encouragent 
!'acceptation de demandes fondees sur la persecution basee sur le sexe sous 
!'egide des categories enumerees. Des affaires recentes indiquent une volonte 
de considerer !es requerants invoquant la discrimination basee sur le sexe 
comme membre d'un groupe social particulier; cependant ces demandes 
doivent toujours satisfaire le test severe de ''persecution" ainsi que de la 
"complicite de l'etat. "Les directives, tout en constituant un developpement 
encourageant, demeure une alternative inadequate a !'inclusion du sexe 
comme une categorie enumeree. 
t B.A. (Wilfred Laurier), M.A. (York), LLB. anticipated 1994 (Dalhousie). 
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The international community is confronted with the challenge of 
dealing with the world's increasing refugee population in a humane 
and compassionate way. Some of these refugees are women fleeing 
gender-based persecution. Women who confront or are oppressed by 
patriarchal institutions often have no choice but to move elsewhere. 
However, there is uncertainty as to whether the protection extended 
to Convention refugees in Canada should also be extended to 
women fleeing gender-based persecution. In the past year, the 
refugee determination system has been heavily criticized by human 
rights and feminist groups for its treatment of female refugee 
claimants. 
Much of the controversy has centred on two high profile cases. 
Nada, a Saudi Arabian woman, claimed refugee status on the basis 
of a fear that she would be arrested and possibly tortured by the 
Saudi religious police. Nada refused to wear a veil and submit to 
other restrictions placed on women in Saudi Arabia. She had been 
attacked and beaten by Islamic fundamentalists for this behaviour. 1 
Dularie Boodlal, a Trinidadian woman, claimed refugee status on 
the basis that she was a victim of domestic violence. She had sought 
the aid of the Trinidadian police on several occasions, but they re-
fused to protect her from her violent spouse.2 
Both women's claims were rejected although they were even-
tually allowed to remain in Canada. Responding to public pressure, 
then Immigration Minister Bernard Valcourt exercised his discre-
tion under section 114(2) of the Immigration Act3 and granted 
asylum on the basis of "compassionate and humanitarian consider-
ations." This involved no change to Canadian law, but allowed for 
an exception to regular practice. It did not address the future 
claims of women refugees, nor did it confront the gendered nature 
of the refugee determination process. In March of 1993, largely in 
response to political pressure mounted by feminist and refugee 
rights groups, new guidelines were introduced to provide assistance 
to the Refugee Determination Board in dealing with claims of gen-
der persecution. 
The guidelines, although a positive step towards addressing the 
plight of women refugees, are not sufficient in and of themselves. 
This paper focusses on the need for a definition of refugee which 
1 Canadian Press (29 January 1993). 
2 Canadian Press (16 September 1992.) 
3 R.S.C. 1985, c. I-2. 
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incorporates the needs and experiences of women fleeing gender-
based persecution. It is divided into three sections. The first section 
provides an overview of the criteria used to determine refugee status 
in Canada by focussing on the definition of "particular social 
group" and by providing some international comparisons. The sec-
ond section focusses on how women's claims for refugee status may 
be brought in Canada by looking at various cases. Since women can 
only claim refugee status on the basis of one of the enumerated 
grounds in the Immigration Act, it is necessary to analyze how the 
courts interpret the various grounds, how these interpretations po-
tentially affect women, and finally how the courts have responded 
to the new guidelines issued in March of 1993. The final section of 
the paper focusses on alternative approaches to dealing with gender-
based persecution. Women fleeing gender-based persecution require 
more than what the Canadian system offers. Neither solely 
incorporating women fleeing gender-based persecution into one of 
the enumerated grounds, nor relying on guidelines that are not 
binding, will satisfy the needs of these women refugees. 
DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS 
In 1985, the United Nations estimated that there were ten million 
refugees world wide, two-thirds of whom were women and chil-
dren. 4 Canada, in accordance with its international and humanitarian 
commitments, admitted 26,575 refugees in 1988. 59% of those 
accepted in the refugee class were male and 41 % were female; a 
widening of the gender gap from the 1980 figures of 56% male and 
44% female. 5 Many of these women came to Canada as the 
dependents of male refugees and did not attempt to claim refugee 
status in independent claims.6 When they did make independent 
4 Refugee here refers to displaced persons generally rather than to the strict 
legal definition of a Convention refugee in The Activities and Programmes of the 
United Nations High Commissioner far Refugees on Behalf of Refugee Women, UN 
Doc. A/CONF.116/11, 30 Apr. 1985 at 5, para. 14. This is a conservative 
estimate. The U.S. Committee for Refugees in its World Survey--1991 estimated 
17 million refugees worldwide. 
5 Employment and Immigration Canada, Immigration to Canada: A Statistical 
Overview, IM 062/11/89. 
6 I am not aware of any statistics available on this issue but see for example 
Sittampa!am (Re) (1991), 13 Imm. L.R. (2d) 287 (Imm. & Ref. BO., Re£ Div). 
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claims, women generally claimed refugee status according to the 
traditionally defined grounds of what constitutes a refugee. 
Section 2 of the Immigration Act states: 
"Convention refugee" means any person who 
(a) by reason of a well-founded fear of persecution 
for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership 
in a particular social group or political opinion, 
(i) is outside the country of the person's nation -
ality and is unable or, by reason of that fear, is 
unwilling to avail himself of the protection of 
that country, or 
(ii) not having a country of nationality, is outside 
the country of the person's former habitual resi-
dence and is unable or, by reason of that fear, is 
unwilling to return to that country, and 
(b) has not ceased to be a Convention refugee by 
virtue of subsection (2), 
but does not include any person to whom the Convention 
does not apply pursuant to Section E or F of Article 1 
thereof, which sections are set out in the schedule to this 
Act.7 
Similar to many other countries, Canada incorporated into domes-
tic legislation the international definition of a refugee that is found 
in the 19 51 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 8 and in the 
1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. 9 
The definition requires that refugee claimants establish a well-
founded fear of persecution, and that the persecution is based on one 
7 Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-2, as am. by R.S.C. 1985 (4th Supp.), c. 28, 
s. 1(2). 
8 28 July 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter Convention]. Article l(A)(2) of 
the Convention defines a refugee as someone who, 
owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons 
of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular 
social group or political opinion, is outide the country of his 
nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling 
to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not 
having a nationality and being outside the country of his 
former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable 
or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it. 
9 31January1967, G.A. Res. 2198 (XX.I), 21 GAOR, Supp (No. 16), U.N. Doc. 
N6316 (1966). 
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of the enumerated grounds, namely race, religion, nationality, 
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. 
Persecution on the basis of sex is not listed in the definition. Thus, 
women fleeing gender-based persecution cannot bring their claim 
specifically on the basis of sex. Instead, they must establish their 
eligibility for refugee status under one of the other headings. While 
there is the potential to base a claim for refugee status on any of the 
enumerated grounds, membership in a "particular social group" is 
often seen as the most viable route for women fleeing gender-based 
persecution. 
International Definition of a Social Group 
"Particular social group" was not defined in the 1951 Convention. 
David Neal emphasizes that "social group" was intended as a resid-
ual category for asylum seekers who did not fall into one of the 
other enumerated areas. He suggests that the drafters of the 
Convention recognized that groups worthy of protection would in-
evitably appear who could not be anticipated in 1951. The drafters 
of the Convention therefore, left the boundaries of the social group 
category undefined in order to retain flexibility for the future. 10 
James Hathaway cautions against using the concept of "particular 
social group" as an all-encompassing residual category. He notes 
that the drafters of the Convention clearly distinguished between 
those whose fear was attributable to their civil and political status, 
and those whose fear was caused by other factors. 11 Nevertheless, 
while Hathaway clearly sees gender as falling within the ambit of a 
particular social group, his focus on civil and political status may 
be unnecessarily limiting as it would require a recognition on the 
part of decision makers that many of the gendered institutions that 
are oppressive to women are socially and politically constructed, 
rather than being natural and immutable. 
Various approaches to the term "particular social group" have 
been adopted within the international community. Some of these 
are highly influential in Canadian courts, others less so. In 1988, the 
Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees published the 
Handbook of Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status. 
IO D. L. Neal, "Women as a Social Group: Recognizing Sex-Based Persecution 
as a Grounds for Asylum" (1988) 20 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 203 at 229. 
11 J.C. Hathaway, The Law of Refugee Status (Toronto: Butterworths, 1991) at 
159. 
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It provides a generalized starting point for determining member-
ship in a social group and focusses on the internal cohesion of a so-
cial group. Paragraph 77 states: 
A particular social group normally comprises persons of 
similar background, habits, or social status .... A claim 
to fear of persecution may frequently overlap with a fear 
of persecution on other grounds, i.e .. race, religion or na-
tionality.12 
The requirement of internal cohesion may be problematic, es-
pecially since there is often the additional expectation that a par-
ticular social group should pose a threat to the state. M. Jane 
Kronenberger notes, 
Thus, it is often the government itself which determines 
the contours of the group which it deems to be a threat to 
its continued rule. The inquiry of the court in ascertaining 
the identifiability of a particular social group must, 
therefore, focus on the role of the agents of persecution in 
attributing certain characteristics to a group and singling 
it out for persecution. There may be historic and 
political reasons for middle class women to defy strict 
Islamic decrees, but this does not mean that a group must 
have formed internally to oppose the regime before a 
claim arising from persecution based on social group 
membership can be established. Refugee determination 
should be based on the government's attribution of char-
acteristics to a "particular social group" that it has chosen 
to persecute. 13 
U.S. jurisprudence has adopted a narrower definition of social 
group which demands a high level of group cohesion. The U.S. 
Court of Appeal defined "particular social group" in Sanchez-
Trujillo v. INS.: 
The statutory words "particular" and "social" which 
modify "group," ... indicate that the term does not en-
compass every broadly defined segment of a population, 
even if a certain demographic division does have some 
12 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Handbook on Procedures 
and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status (Geneva: Office of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 1988). 
l3 M. Jane Kronenberger, "Refugee Women: Establishing a Prima Facie Case 
Under the Refugee Convention" (1992) 15 ILSAJ. Int'!. L. 61at76. 
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statistical relevance. Instead, the phrase "particular social 
group" implies a collection of people closely affiliated 
with each other, who are actuated by some common im -
pulse or interest. Of central concern is the existence of a 
voluntary associational relationship among the purported 
members, which imparts some common characteristic 
that is fundamental to their identity as a member of that 
discrete social group. 14 
87 
The Canadian system has been resistant to the limited interpreta-
tion espoused in Sanchez-Trujillo. Sanchez-Trujillo was denied 
refugee status because "young El Salvadorean males of military 
age" did not constitute a particular social group. Significantly, the 
Canadian Immigration Appeal Board made the opposite ruling in 
Marco Antonio Valladares Escoto v. M.E.J. 15 
The European Parliament determined in 1984 that women with 
a well founded fear of persecution because they have "transgressed 
social mores" should be considered a particular social group under 
the Convention refugee definition. 16 The High Commissioner ac-
knowledged the existence of gender-based persecution in the "Note 
on Refugee Women and International Protection."17 He suggested 
that it may be appropriate to adopt the reasoning of the European 
Parliament, especially in light of the U.N.'s commitment to 
gender equality as evidenced by the Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. 18 
The European Parliament definition expands the definition of 
social group to identify certain groups of women. However, it does 
not provide protection for women fleeing domestic violence who 
cannot be said to have "transgressed the social mores of the society 
in which they live." Canada has recognized the limitation of this 
definition proposed by the European Parliament, and, in certain 
cases, Canadian courts have further expanded the types of claims 
women can make under the "social group" category. Nevertheless, 
14 801 F.2d 1571 (9th Cir. 1986) at 1576. 
15 CT une 1988) Imm. Appeal Board Decision 111.8. 
l6 European Parliament Resolution (April 13, 1984) discussed by S. Forbes 
Martin in Refagee Women (New Jersey: Zed Book, 1992) at 24-25; see also 
Kronenburger, supra note 13 at 62-63. 
l7 UNHCR 1990e. The U.N. Note is discussed in Forbes Martin, ibid. at 24-
25. 
18 (1979), 1249 U.N.T.S.13, 1982 Can T.S. No. 31. 
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Canada has yet to enunciate a clear test which will provide protec-
tion for all women fleeing gender-based persecution. 
CANADIAN JURISPRUDENCE 
For a number of years, Canada recognized social group claims only 
when the social group could establish a nexus to one of the other four 
enumerated grounds of civil or political status. 19 The court stated in 
Obertz Belfond: 
Either the group must be political and proclaim and ex -
hibit dissidence with the regime or be a religious sect 
which has been persecuted by the civil authorities because 
of its religious beliefs. In a multinational state, a racial 
minority might also constitute such a group. 20 
In later decisions, the courts have moved away from this narrow 
approach in order to endow "particular social group" with a wider 
meaning. Courts and tribunals were quite flexible in their approach 
to what constitutes a social group and, at times, were receptive to 
the claims of women. The Immigration Appeal Board decided in 
Zekiye Incirciyan21 that single Turkish women living in a Moslem 
country without the protection of a male relative constituted a par-
ticular social group. The Immigration and Refugee Board reached 
similar decisions for Moslem women in Lebanon and for Tamil 
Women in Sri Lanka.22 The courts, however, have not attempted to 
develop a comprehensive test for the determination of a particular 
social group until recently. Three recent decisions provide some 
indication of where the refugee determination system may be 
heading on this issue. 
1. Canada (Attorney General) v. W ard23 
Ward is the leading case on what constitutes "particular social 
group." It dealt with a former Irish National Liberation Army 
!9 Hathaway, supra note 11at157-158. 
20 (1975),10 IAC 208 at 222, cited in Hathaway, supra note 11at157. 
21 (10 August 1987) Imm. Appeal Board Decision M87-1541X, quoted in 
Hathaway, supra note 11 at 162. 
22 Imm. Ref. B. Decision T89-00260, July 1989 and M89-0213, June 1989, 
quoted in Hathaway ibid. at 162. 
23 (1990), 108 N.R. 60 (F.C.A.) [hereinafter Ward]. 
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(INLA) supporter who attempted to disassociate himself from the 
organization after releasing two of the hostages he had been assigned 
to guard. He was court-martialled by the INLA and sentenced to 
death. Mr Ward sought refugee status in Canada. 
The majority of the Federal Court of Appeal rejected Ward's 
claim that the INLA constituted a "particular social group." 
However, both the majority and the minority decisions endorsed a 
purposive interpretation of "particular social group" in light of sec-
tion 3(g) of the Immigration Act which states the objective of the 
Act: 
To fulfil Canada's international legal obligations with 
respect to refugees, and to uphold its humanitarian tra-
dition with respect to the displaced and persecuted. 
In defining social group, Urie, J.A., for the majority, reasoned 
that persecution for membership in a social group can only occur 
when the group's activities are perceived to be a possible danger to 
the state: 
It is implicit from the foregoing that the persecution 
arising from membership in a social group must arise 
from its activities perceived to be a possible danger of 
some kind to the government. 24 
While internal cohesion in membership is one criteria, establishing a 
refugee claim on the basis of membership in a "particular social 
group" requires that the group pose a threat to the state and that the 
fear of persecution be connected to this threat. Urie, ].A. found that 
Ward's fear was not directed at the state but at INLA which 
viewed him as a traitor, and had sentenced him to death. Thus, the 
claimant's fear arose from within the group itself; it was not linked 
to the state. It could be argued that this restricted definition was in-
tended, for policy reasons, to exclude terrorists from the social 
group category and should not be applied too broadly. 
MacGuigan, J .A., in dissent, adopted a more liberal interpreta-
tion of social group. He drew a clear distinction between natural 
and non-natural groups. He noted that characteristics of a non-natural 
social group included members united in a stable association for 
24 Ibid at 65. 
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common purposes.25 Using this definition, he was prepared to find 
that INLA constituted a social group. 
The majority and minority decisions differed greatly on the 
understanding of persecution. Urie, J.A., for the majority, accepted 
that state complicity is a prerequisite for establishing persecution. 
MacGuigan, J.A., in dissent, argued that it is sufficient that the state 
is unable to protect the individual. 
The majority decision of the Federal Court of Appeal in Ward 
makes it difficult for women to advance refugee claims. Women 
who are persecuted for their failure to conform to traditional social 
customs would need to establish that their actions were perceived as 
a threat to the state, rather than as an issue of morality. Jacqueline 
Greatbatch argues convincingly that women's resistance to the 
wearing of the chador in Iran challenges Islamic fundamentalism 
which is the basis of state power, and is, therefore, a threat to the 
state. However, because of the distinction drawn between public and 
private life, and the delegation of women's activities to the private 
sphere, it is difficult to convince refugee boards of the political 
nature of these women's actions.26 
The Federal Court of Appeal decision in Ward was overturned 
by the Supreme Court of Canada in Ward v M.E.l. 27 La Forest, J. 
defined a "particular social group" to include: 
(1) groups defined by innate or unchangeable character-
istics 
(2) groups whose members voluntarily associate for rea-
sons so fundamental to their human dignity that they 
should not be forced to forsake that association 
(3) groups associated by former voluntary status unalter-
able due to its historic importance. 28 
La Forest, J. found that INLA did not meet this definition of a 
"particular social group," but went on to decide that Ward was be-
ing persecuted on the basis of political opinion. 
The application of the definition of the Supreme Court of 
Canada as it relates to women seeking refugee status is somewhat 
25 Ibid. at 72. 
26 J. Greatbatch, "The Gender Difference: Feminist Critiques of Refugee 
Discourse" (1989) 1 Int'lJ. Refug. L. 518 at 519-523. 
27 (1993), 20 Imm. LR. (2d) 85 (S.C.C.). 
2s Ibid. at 121-122. 
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uncertain. La Forest, J. quoted with approval M.M. v. M.E.J.29 and 
Cheungv. M.E.J.,30 both of which contemplate gender as the basis of 
membership in a particular social group. In these cases gender was 
viewed as an innate and immutable characteristic. However, case 
law has developed whereby women are required to establish their 
claim as a sub-group, such as "women who are victims of domestic 
violence," in order to advance refugee claims of a gender-based 
nature. It is not clear whether such a sub-group would meet the 
requirements of the test La Forest, J. establishes. Women within 
these sub-groups are often isolated from other women in the same 
position and they do not necessarily constitute a voluntary organi-
zation. Finally, neither the failure to comply with traditional social 
mores, nor the fact that they are battered, is an unchangeable or in-
nate characteristic. 
In his decision, La Forest, J. also considered the issue of perse-
cution in relation to a claim for refugee status. He concluded that an 
applicant could meet the social group category either by estab-
lishing state complicity or the state's inability to provide 
protection for the applicant. In situations where state officials have 
admitted that they are unable to provide protection, or where the 
applicant can demonstrate this inability through clear and 
convincing evidence, persecution may be established. It is only in 
situations in which state protection might reasonably have been 
forthcoming that the claimant's failure to approach the state for 
protection will defeat the claim.3 1 This finding is important 
because it allows for a positive ruling in situations where the person 
is being persecuted by someone other than the state. 
For women fleeing domestic violence, however, gathering evi-
dence and establishing state complicity is difficult since their 
claim of persecution derives from a shared cultural understanding of 
the state agent and the batterer which defines women as unworthy of 
protection. 
29 [1992] F.C.J. No. 1077 (QL). 
30 (1993), 19 Imm. L.R. (2d) 81 (F.C.A). 
3l This is in line with the Federal Court of Appeal position subsequent to its 
decision in Wara'. See for example, Salibian v. MEL (1990), 73 D.L.R. (4th) 5 51 
(F.CA). 
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2. N.(L.X) (Re),32 (Inaudi) 
In lnaudi, the Immigration and Refugee Board addressed the defi-
nition of social group in reaching its decision that homosexuals in 
Argentina constitute a "social group" within the meaning of Section 
2(1) of the Immigration Act. Teitelbaum, one of the adjudicators in 
this hearing, held that since social group was not defined by the 
Immigration Act, the words should be given their ordinary or usual 
meaning. She adopted the Oxford dictionary definition of "social" 
as "capable of being associated or united" and the definition of 
"group" as "a number of persons classed together on account of a 
certain degree of similarity. "33 Colle, the other adjudicator in this 
hearing, adopted a more restrictive definition of social group. The 
definition reads: 
People in social groups are conscious of belonging to-
gether in common memberships, and a group possesses 
some mechanism to determine who belongs and who does 
not. 34 
Considering the wide diversity among women, it is uncertain 
whether women are encompassed by either of these definitions. 
However, both board members were willing to find that homosex-
uals were encompassed by the definition. Homosexuals, like 
women, also come from a variety and backgrounds and lead widely 
diverse lives. However, in this case the Board focussed on the "gay 
lifestyle" of the refugee claimant and on societal stereotypes. In this 
way they found common membership in a "social group." It may be 
difficult to establish an equivalent commonality of a shared female 
culture. The definitions of "social" put forward by both ad-
judicators may effectively exclude women since their persecution 
results more from the status ascribed to them in a patriarchal soci-
ety than from any sense of self-definition from within the group. 
Both board members in lnaudi placed considerable emphasis on 
the fact that a social group should be based on an immutable char-
acteristic. Teitelbaum refused to state categorically that homosex-
uality was an immutable characteristic and qualified "particular so-
cial group" to include voluntary conditions which are so fundamen-
32 [1992] C.R.D.D. No. 47 [hereinafter lnaudi]. 
33/bid. 
34 Ibid. 
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tal to a person's identity that a complainant ought not to be com-
pelled to change it. 
3. M.M. v. M.E.J.35 
M.M. involved the judicial review of the decision of a Credible 
Basis Panel. It is one of the few cases dealing directly with gender-
based persecution. The case indicates that individual women appli-
cants must base their claims for refugee status within particular 
"sub-groups" of women. M.M. was a Trinidadian woman who was 
subject to domestic violence. She was unable to gain the protection 
of the Trinidadian state because of the indifference of its authori-
ties. 
In M.M the Federal Court of Appeal rejected the argument 
that its decision in Ward applied as precedent. The Court found 
that Ward did not propose any workable test for the recognition of 
other social group claims. In addition, it held that the facts in Ward 
were so different from the present case as to make Ward inapplica-
ble. When M.M. was decided Ward had not yet been argued before 
the Supreme Court of Canada. It is a matter of speculation whether 
the Federal Court would have felt constrained by the test of a social 
group established by La Forest, J. It is not clear whether the sub-
group of "Trinidadian women subject to domestic violence" could 
meet the requirements of his test. 
The Federal Court of Appeal in MM. stated that while women 
may constitute a social group, they cannot correctly be character-
ized as a particular social group within the meaning of the statute. 
Thus, the group must be limited to "Trinidadian women subject to 
wife abuse." Felicite Stairs and Lori Pope, two scholars in this area, 
recognize that this constitutes a potential problem because once a 
woman is removed from a battering situation she is no longer a 
member of that social group, even though she will revert back to 
that status if her refugee claim is denied. 36 The Federal Court of 
Appeal concluded its decision by stating: 
A question may be posed for the future; since, in this 
context, persecution must be feared by reason of mem-
bership in a particular social group, can fear of that perse-
35 Supra note 29 [hereinafter MM]. 
36 Felicite Stairs and Lori Pope, "No Place Like Home: Assaulted Migrant 
Women's Claims to Refugee Status and Landings on Humanitarian and 
Compassionate Grounds" (1990) 6 ]. L. & Social Pol'y 148 at 172-173. 
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cution be the sole distinguishing factor that results in what 
is at most merely a social group becoming a particular 
social group. 37 
Clearly this is the argument women need to make in order to seek 
recognition as a particular social group. They must establish their 
membership in a sub-group of women, such as those who are victims 
of domestic violence, or those who transgress social mores, and 
establish that this sub-group possesses sufficient common character-
istics to constitute a particular social group. 
Canadian courts and immigration tribunals have, in some in-
stances, been willing to extend protection to vulnerable groups, in-
cluding certain sub-groups of women. This seems to provide spo-
radic protection. Because there exists no well established test for 
determining what constitutes a social group, much is left to the dis-
cretion of individual adjudicators. While women fleeing persecu-
tion may continue to base their claims on membership in a social 
group, or on their political beliefs, immigration lawyers say that 
their success with such cases is poor and often depends upon the 
constitution of the Refugee Board that hears the case.38 On March 9, 
1993, a set of guidelines was issued by the Immigration and 
Refugee Board.39 The new guidelines represent a significant lib-
eralization of the Board's approach to gender-based persecution. 
The new guidelines encourage those claiming gender-based perse-
cution to incorporate their claims under one of the other enumerated 
grounds. The guidelines emphasize that gender often intercepts with 
other forms of persecution. They purport to deal with most gender-
based claims involving women who have transgressed religious or 
social norms under the enumerated categories of religion and 
political opinion. The guidelines explicitly recognize that women 
who are exposed to violence, and are unprotected, are encompassed 
under the heading of membership in a social group. A discussion of 
several cases decided under the new gender guidelines follows. 
37 MM v. ME.I, supra note 29 at 10. 
38 Canadian Press (25 September 1992). 
39 Immigration and Refugee Board, Guidelines Issued by the Chairperson 
Pursuant to Section 65(3) of the Immigration Act: Women Refugee Claimants 
Fearing Gender-Related Persecution, 9 March 1990. 
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4. C.(X.N.) (Re)4o 
The C.(XN) (Re) case involved an Ecuadorian woman who claimed 
that she was subject to domestic abuse and that the Ecuadorian 
government was unwilling to protect her. The Canadian Refugee 
Determination Division [hereafter C.R.D.D.J determined that 
women who were subject to domestic violence shared a similar 
background and therefore constituted a particular social group. This 
reasoning is somewhat surprising considering the vast differences 
that exist among battered women. 
After accepting that women subject to domestic violence 
constitute a social group, the tribunal considered whether the state 
was unwilling to protect the refugee claimant. Extensive evidence 
was presented to show that battered women were afforded little 
protection by the Ecuadorian state, including reports by various 
agencies and organizations, and evidence that domestic violence is 
not a crime in Ecuador and therefore does not carry any type of 
punishment. The C.R.D .D. accepted this evidence as proof of state 
complicity and accepted the refugee application of C(X.N.). 
The decision of the C.R.D.D. in C(XN) has not always been 
duplicated in other decisions involving victims of domestic vio-
lence. In both A.(I.E.)(Re)41 and N(L.Y.) (Re)42 the C.R.D.D. 
accepted that women who were victims of domestic violence quali-
fied as members of a social group. However, both these women 
were unable to establish the complicity of the Jamaican or 
Grenadian states, and thus their refugee claims failed. It should be 
noted that neither women had access to the type of expert evidence 
offered by C(X.N.) in the Ecuadorian case, and both Jamaica and 
Grenada had formal laws prohibiting domestic violence. 
5. X.(G.C.) (Re)43 
In this case, a woman from China was in contravention of the state's 
one-child-only policy when she became pregnant with her second 
child. As a result, she experienced a forced abortion, had her busi-
ness license withdrawn, and was sought by the state for compulsory 
sterilization. It was accepted that the claimant was entitled to seek 
40 [1993) C.R.D.D No. 28 (QL). 
4I [1993) C.R.D.D. No. 111 (QL). 
42 [1993) C.R.D.D. No. 55 (QL). 
43 [1993) C.R.D.D. No. 64 (QL). 
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refugee status on the grounds of political opinion with little discus-
sion. Furthermore, since the state was the agent of persecution, there 
was no issue of state complicity. The Board determined that the 
claimant had good grounds to fear persecution if she was forced to 
return to China. 
The gender guidelines encourage the acceptance of gender-based 
persecution under various grounds, including membership in a social 
group and political opinion, with very little discussion. Thus, it is 
easier for women to get past this preliminary hurdle. However, in 
making such determinations, the board seems to be focussing on 
what constitutes state complicity. Thus, in cases like X (G. C.) (Re), 
where the state is clearly the agent of persecution, it is much easier 
for a woman to make a claim of gender-based persecution. In cases 
involving domestic violence, it is more difficult to establish state 
complicity. 
6. Y.(R.W.) (Re)44 
Y. (R. W) (Re) involved a Muslim woman from Algeria who 
escaped to Canada in order to avoid being forced into an arranged 
marriage. She claimed persecution on the grounds of religion, and 
argued that she feared her father would kill her for refusing to con-
form to the Islamic way of life by failing to accept the arranged 
marriage. The C.R.D.D. readily accepted that women who 
transgress the traditional mores of society in Muslim countries are 
persecuted on the basis of religious belief. 
The Tribunal focussed predominately on state complicity to 
persecution. They found that Y.(R.W.) could not obtain state pro-
tection because her father was a well-known religious authority, both 
in his community and throughout Algeria. 
Y.(R. W) (Re) forms an interesting contrast to N.(L.Y.) (Re).45 In 
N. (L. Y.) (Re) the C.R.D.D. failed to accept that N.(L.Y.) was 
unable to seek police protection from domestic violence. She testi-
fied that Grenadian police do not take domestic violence very seri-
ously and that it was futile to seek police protection because her fa-
ther was a member of the police department. She testified that al-
though her father no longer held a prominent position because he had 
been demoted as a result of alcohol problems, he still wielded 
44 [1993] C.R.D.D. No. 54 (QL). 
45 Supra note 42. 
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considerable influence within the police department. In N. (L. Y.) 
(Re) the C.R.D.D. was unwilling to accept state complicity to per-
secution because of the institutional position held by the perpetrator 
of the violence. Yet they accepted that argument in Y. (R. W) (Re). 
The new guidelines appear to effectively address the concerns of 
women who have transgressed the traditional mores of society. 
These women are able to establish their claim under the established 
grounds of religion or political opinion, and there is a willingness 
in the C.R.D.D. to accept state complicity to their persecution. 
However, state complicity is more difficult to establish in cases of 
domestic violence. It may be that in considering persecution, a tri-
bunal is more willing to accept state complicity in "exotic" situa-
tions such as sterilization in China or forced marriages in Algeria. 
Situations involving domestic violence are often disturbingly 
familiar. 
APPROACHES TO DEALING WITH 
GENDER-BASED PERSECUTION 
There are two approaches to dealing with gender-based persecution. 
One approach advocates the incorporation of gender-based perse-
cution under one of the enumerated grounds, whether it be religion, 
political opinion, or membership in a particular social group. This 
approach emphasizes that gender often intersects with other forms of 
persecution. This is the position advocated by the guidelines. The 
other approach favours identifying sex specifically as a ground for 
establishing a refugee claim. 
The new guidelines outline how claims of gender-based perse-
cution can fit within the current definitions of persecution under the 
other enumerated categories. Thus, for example, a woman may 
claim that reprisals for failure to observe traditional Islamic 
custom constitutes religious-based persecution. 
The current definition of religious persecution appears to be 
broad enough to encompass persecution within a religious group. 
Hathaway suggests that the definition of religious persecution at in-
ternational law includes the right to hold or not to hold any particu-
lar religious belief, and the right to practice any religion, including 
participation in, or abstinence from, formal worship and religious 
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practices.46 The Immigration Appeal Board has accepted that re-
ligious behaviour includes more than formal acts of worship and 
may encompass other acts of political significance. In Luis Alberto 
Mena Ramirezv. M.E.I. the Immigration Appeal Board found that 
conscientious objection to military service constituted a religious 
belief. They stated: 
the Board [found] a systematic persecution by reason of 
religion. It is the failure of the recruiting system to make 
allowances for the convictions of the conscientious objec-
tor that forms the basis of the fear. Such a failure amounts 
to fear of persecution within the meaning of the Act. 47 
This is similar to the situation in some Islamic countries where 
state laws fail to accommodate those individuals who do not 
follow the predominant religion or some tenets of it. 
Establishing religious persecution also requires that state in-
volvement in the persecution, or in the state's failure to protect the 
individual, be proved. Thus, women fleeing gender-based persecu-
tion in some Islamic states should be able to claim persecution on 
the basis of religion under the current definition. 
Women who are victims of violence could possibly bring their 
claim under the enumerated ground of political opinion. In Lazo-
Majano v. l.NS.,48 the U.S. Court of Appeal granted refugee status 
to an El Salvadorean woman who had been physically and sexually 
abused by a low ranking member of the military. She sought 
asylum on the basis of political opinion. Noonan, J. stated: 
So in this case, if the situation is seen in its social context, 
Zuniga is asserting the political opinion that a man has a 
right to dominate and he has persecuted Olimpia to force 
her to accept this opinion without rebellion.49 
Thus, the U.S. Court has expressed some willingness to examine the 
ideological underpinnings of violence against women under the 
category of political opinion. The case was not, however, decided 
46 Supra note 11 at 145-146. This is based on Hathaway's analysis of the Draft 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of 
Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, UN Doc. E/1980/13 and the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, U.N.G.A. Res. 217A (III), 10 December 1948. 
47 (May 1988) Imm. Appeal Board Decision 110.15. 
48 813 F.2d 1432 (9th Cir. 1987). 
49 Ibid at 1435. 
GENDER-BASED PERSECUTION 99 
on this basis. The Court, in making its decision, reverted to a more 
traditional analysis of political opinion as holding views subversive 
to the government. 
It may be possible to construct a successful argument for rec-
ognizing gender-based persecution as an element of political opin-
ion. If so, this would be a positive development because it would 
then be recognized that women's relationships, often confined to the 
private sphere, are indeed political. However, the opinion of 
Noonan, J. in Lazo-Majano was particularly enlightened and is un-
likely to gain widespread acceptance by Canadian courts. The new 
guidelines seem to reject this possibility, preferring to deal with 
women fleeing domestic violence under membership in a particular 
social group. 
James Hathaway has raised concerns about enumerating sex as a 
ground for refugee status. He states: 
The problem is that if one, at this stage pursues the in-
clusion of gender and leaves aside all of these other im -
portant categories that have seen to be without the social 
group category, I think that you end up privileging one 
form of disenfranchisement over all of the others. so 
This argument would tend to favour pursuing gender-based 
claims under the category of particular social group. Undoubtedly, 
the inclusion of sex as a grounds for a refugee claim would provide 
express protection to women. However, any gains made by women 
in the "particular social group" category would benefit other disad-
vantaged groups that are less mobilized. 
Jacqueline Greatbatch adopts this position. She argues that ade-
quate protection for women lies not merely in creating a separate 
female paradigm for gender-based claims but in the development 
of a broader human rights paradigm.51 There is a concern that es-
tablishing sex as a separate category will lead to the 
marginalization of women's concerns rather than establishing them 
as significant and compelling human rights. However, women can 
forge alliances with other disenfranchised groups and agitate for the 
development of a broader human rights paradigm while still 
seeking explicit statutory rights for women. By entrenching their 
so Estanislao Oziewicz, "Why a Change of Heart Does Not Change Policy" 
Globe and Mail (5 February 1993). 
5! Supra note 26 at 526. 
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position, women may actually make the position of other groups 
stronger. 
A major concern with the guidelines is that they are more sus-
ceptible to change than legislation and may be altered once the po-
litical pressure mobilized around the issue of gender-based persecu-
tion subsides. The guidelines are not binding on members of the 
refugee board and do not constitute official government policy or 
law. 
Tribunals are not bound by precedent established at other tri-
. bunal hearings, so the guidelines do not establish an authoritative 
body of case law. Lee Cohen, an immigration lawyer in Halifax, 
Nova Scotia suggests that refugee boards are often very conservative 
and that the guidelines may be more influential at the appeal 
level.52 The guidelines may act to persuade the court to broaden the 
definition of a particular social group established by the Supreme 
Court of Canada in Ward v. M.E.f.53 Until this happens, however, 
the decisions made under the guidelines have no precedent-setting 
authority. 
The guidelines simply encourage an interpretation of the 
Convention refugee definition which recognizes gender-related 
claims. They seek to promote consistency in refugee board deci-
sions. They do not carry statutory authority which is the major ad-
vantage of including gender explicitly as a grounds for claiming 
refugee status. 
It has been suggested that the definition of a Convention 
refugee, drafted in 19 51 before the modern feminist movement, 
should be updated to include persecution on the basis of sex. There 
is, however, some concern that any amendment to the definition of a 
Convention refugee in the Immigration Act to include gender may 
disturb its integrity at international law. James Hathaway, has 
stated: 
If we were to reopen it for this in the age of 
restrictionism in which we now live, there is an 
overwhelming probability that a lot of the protections 
that refugees currently enjoy would be taken out of the 
Convention. There is a big, big risk factor if you are 
52 Lecture at Dalhousie Law School, Halifax, N.S., 18 March 1993. 
53 Supra note 27. 
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going to re-open an international Convention in an era 
when Canada is the best player on a bad team.54 
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This is unconvincing. Canada has incorporated the international 
definition of a Convention refugee into domestic law, the defini-
tion can be altered in the Canadian context through an amendment 
to the Immigration Act. That amendment would not alter the defi-
nition at international law; Canada would simply go beyond what 
is demanded of us under international treaty obligations. 
Furthermore, Canadian decision makers must also interpret the 
Convention in a manner consistent with the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms.55 The Immigration Act, like all federal legis-
lation, must conform to Charter standards. This is further enforced 
by section 3(f) of the Immigration Act which states: 
3. It is hereby declared that Canadian immigration pol-
icy and the rules and regulations made under this Act 
shall be designed and administered in such a manner as to 
promote the domestic and international interests of 
Canada recognizing the need ... 
(f) to ensure that any person who seeks admission to 
Canada on either a permanent or temporary basis is 
subject to standards of admission that do not dis-
criminate in a manner inconsistent with the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 
Immigration policy must be implemented in conformity with 
the Charter which lists sex as a prohibited ground of discrimination 
under section 15. There is no direct discrimination on the basis of 
sex since women can establish their refugee claims under the same 
enumerated categories as men. However, it could be argued that the 
statute is under inclusive because it fails to accommodate the 
differences between men and women refugees. The Convention 
refugee definition which is incorporated into Canadian law does not 
accord protection for women fleeing domestic violence, an ex-
clusively female experience. Stairs and Pope argue that decision 
makers can provide international protection without violating the 
Charter through a liberal interpretation of particular social group, 
well founded fear of persecution, and state protection.56 This is also 
54 Quoted in Oziewicz, supra note 50. 
55 Part I of the Comtitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 
(U.K), 1982, c. 11. 
56 Supra note 36 at 165. 
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the position of the new guidelines. Considering the restrictions 
being placed on the definition of a particular social group, and the 
uncertainty in the application of the concept by the courts, it may be 
preferable to use the Charter to argue for explicit recognition of 
gender in the definition of a Convention refugee. 
It is advised that gender-based persecution be dealt with sepa-
rately. Doreen Indra argues that Canadian refugee policy has sys-
tematically neglected gender as a critical consideration.57 Refugee 
categories have been shaped predominately by the male refugee ex-
perience. It is important that women's experiences be recognized as 
distinct. Women should not be invisible within the immigration 
system, and dealing with gender-based persecution separately forces 
a recognition of the particular position of women which otherwise 
could be too easily overlooked. 
Then Minister of Immigration, Bernard Valcourt, expressed 
some concern that in dealing with gender-based persecution, Canada 
needs to be sensitive to cultural differences and should not impose 
its values on other countries.58 Ed Broadbent, Director of the 
International Centre for Human Rights, addressed this concern, 
stating: 
We're not talking about forcing Saudi Arabia to change 
its behaviour, we're talking about our own government 
changing its domestic practices when it comes to refugee 
law to be consistent with what we believe. 59 
While Canada needs to respect other cultures, we also have an ethi-
cal obligation to promote human rights. 
The particular position of the refugee claimant should not be 
overlooked when that refugee is a woman who clearly defines her 
treatment as gender-based persecution. Thus, it is not primarily the 
Canadian state defining what constitutes persecution in the foreign 
context. The Canadian state should respect the view of the refugee 
claimant especially where it corresponds to our own value system. 
Bernard Valcourt also expressed some concern that allowing 
persecuted women to claim refugee status on the basis of sex would 
57 D. Indra "Gender: A Key Dimension of the Refugee Experience" (1987) 6 
Refuge 3 at 3. 
58 Canadian Press (29 January 1993). 
59 Canadian Press (24 January 1993). 
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lead to a strain on the immigration system. 60 Rebecca Cook, a 
University of Toronto law professor, expressed similar sentiments: 
Generosity, while a good idea in principle could also 
create a refugee flood because of widespread oppression 
of women around the world.61 
This position may be somewhat overstated and is explicitly 
rejected in the guidelines. Section 2(1)(a)(i) of the Immigration Act 
states that the claimant must be "outside the country of that person's 
nationality" to apply for refugee status. The majority of women 
suffering gender-based persecution simply do not have the resources 
to leave their oppressive situation in order to claim refugee status in 
Canada. 
Furthermore, under section 2(1)(a), the refugee claimant must 
establish a well founded fear of persecution and their state's unwill-
ingness or inability to protect them. The cases decided under the 
new guidelines indicate that this is a significant burden to dis-
charge. This is, thus, a further check on any potential flood of 
women wishing to claim refugee status. 
Some critics feel that the floodgates argument is flawed philo-
sophically. David Neal argues that, on a conceptual level, asylum 
under the Convention refugee definition is designed as an individ-
ual, not a class remedy. Class size, therefore, should not be a fun-
damental concern. He states: 
In other words, while country conditions must play an 
evidentiary role, they are not determinative. As they 
should not require, so should they not preclude the grant-
ing of asylum. 62 
James Hathaway emphasizes that we should determine mem-
bership in a particular social group using the ejusdem generis princi-
ple. Thus, we should extend protection to those persons whose civil 
and political status puts them at comparable risk to those in other 
enumerated categories. He argues, therefore, that sex-based claims 
should not be defeated by the flood gates argument since race, na-
tionality, religion, and political opinion are also characteristics 
shared by large numbers of people.63 The floodgates argument 
60 Canadian Press (25 January 1993). 
61 Ibid. 
62 Neal, supra note IO at 240. 
63 Hathaway, supra note 11 at 163. 
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should not stand as an impediment to the inclusion of sex as a 
ground for claiming refugee status. 
CONCLUSION 
Gender-based persecution is a pressing social problem which gener-
ates refugees. Canada needs to develop a refugee system sensitive to 
the needs of female refugee claimants, and one able to deal effec-
tively with gender-based claims. 
The new guidelines are a positive step toward dealing with gen-
der-based persecution. However, they do not provide an adequate 
substitute for a legislative initiative. Ideally, gender-based persecu-
tion should be addressed through the explicit addition of sex to the 
list of enumerated categories, either by amending the Immigration 
Act, or by mounting a Charter challenge and forcing its amendment. 
This would provide the maximum protection for women and ensure 
that women are not rendered invisible by a system which does not 
explicitly acknowledge the experiences of women refugees. A 
legislative provision is more permanent because the procedure for 
amendment and revocation is more formal than that of guidelines, 
and legislation is binding on both tribunals and courts. 
The decisions under the new guidelines in N. (L. Y.) (ReJ4 and 
A. (I.E.) (Ref'5 demonstrate that it is not sufficient to focus exclu-
sively on including sex within religion, political opinion or 
membership in a particular social group as grounds for claiming 
refugee status. More women have been able to establish a ground for 
claiming refugee status since the guidelines have been implemented. 
However, the liberalization of refugee policy on gender-based per-
secution has been hindered by the stringent application of the tests 
of what constitutes persecution and state complicity. The rigid 
application of these tests has served to disqualify many of the 
women advancing claims of gender-based persecution. In searching 
for answers to gender bias in the refugee determination system, the 
ability of human rights advocates to place effective political 
pressure on the government is the key determining factor. 
64 Supra note 42. 
65 Supra note 41. 
